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Summary findings
Aid and conditionalities are the "carrots and sticks" of  knowledge to the learner through training and
the conventional direct approach to fostering economic  instruction. These pedagogies-translated  into social and
development. The economic theory of agency is the most  economic development as learning writ large-form  the
sophisticated treatment of the direct carrots-and-sticks  basis for an alternative indirect approach to fostering
approach to influencing human behavior.  development.
Considering the outcomes of the conventional  Actions have motives just as beliefs have grounds,
approach, it might be worthwhile to explore alternative  concludes Ellerman. In the wide spectrum of human
indirect approaches that focus on enabling clients to act  endeavor, there is only a fairly small "bandwidth"  in
more autonomously, rather than try for fuller control of  which motives can be supplied by the carrots and sticks
clients' actions (or "agents' behaviors") with improved  of the direct approach (including agency theory and
carrots and sticks.  market-driven activities as special cases of the direct
Are there inherent limitations in the direct approach  approach to affecting behavior). Outside that spectrum,
that will not be addressed with better crafted "agency  trying to use direct methods in a controlling manner
contracts" or closer monitoring of the agents?  contradicts the motives for actions (and the grounds for
Ellerman traces the intellectual history of indirect  beliefs)-like  trying to "buy love."
approaches from Socrates to modern thinkers such as  For higher activities, motives must come from within.
Wittgenstein, Gandhi, and McGregor.  Helpers can at best use an indirect approach to bring
One theme of his survey is that constructivist and  doers to the threshold; the doers have to do the rest,
active-learning pedagogies constitute an indirect  which makes the results their own.
approach in which the teacher does not directly transmit
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Three  very different  examples  of an "indirect  approach"  with serve  to introduce  the variety and
importance  of the idea:
>  the indirect  approach  in matters  of strategy  in military  as well as broader  human  affairs,
>  the indirect  approach  to learning  in the higher  animals  (in comparison  with,  say,  insects),  and
>  the indirect  approach  as a class  of social  policies  that  operate  by enabling  private and
collective  actors  instead  of trying  to directly  control  their  actions.
The  Indirect  Approach  in Strategy
Liddel  Hart's  (1895-1970)  classic  book  Strategy  [1967]  evolved  from  a 1941  book entitled  The
Strategy  of Indirect  Approach. Hart saw  that the indirect  approach  that he recommended  in
military  strategy  was in fact  part of a much broader  indirect  approach  that could  be applied
elsewhere  in human  affairs.
With deepening  reflection,... I began to realize  that the indirect  approach  had a
much wider application-that it was a  law of life in  all spheres: a  truth of
philosophy. Its fulfilment  was seen to be the key to practical achievement  in
dealing  with any problem  where  the human  factor  predominates,  and a conflict  of
wills tends to spring  from an underlying  concern  for interests. In all such cases,
the direct assaull:  of new ideas provokes  a stubborn  resistance,  thus intensifying
the difficulty  of producing  a change  of outlook. ...
This idea of the indirect approach is closely related to  all problems of the
influence  of mind upon mind-the most influential  factor in human  history. [Hart
1941,  x]
The Indirect  Approach  in Biological  Learning  Mechanisms
A very different  area  where  the "indirect  approach"  is prominent  is in the comparative  biology  of
learning  mechanisms.  There  are two  very different  ways  in which  teaching  and learning  can take
place. Both  ways occur  biologically  if we view what is transmitted  through  the genetic
mechanism  from an organism  to its offspring  as the biological  version  of what is transmitted
from the teacher  to the learner. For many  organisms,  insects  being  a good example,  the specific
behaviors  (that are fitted  to certain  stable  environments)  are transmitted  by the genes  from
parents  to offspring. The individual  organism  does  not engage  in learning  from the environment
as the appropriate  behaviors  are already  determined  by the structure  of the organism  that was
transmitted  through  the genes. Thus  any learning  takes  place  only at the species  level,  not at the
individual  level. Norbert  Wiener  calls this "phylogenetic  learning"  as opposed  to "ontogenetic
learning"  [1961,  169]. For instance,  insects  have only  phylogenetic  learning  whereas  the
mammals  ("higher  animals")  have  both  phylogenetic  learning  and ontogenetic  learning.
[The] very physical development  of the insect conditions  it to be an essentially
stupid  and unlearning  individual,  cast in a mold which  cannot  be modified  to any
great extent.... O:n  the other hand, ... the human individual  [is] capable of vastlearning  and  study,  ...[and] is physically  equipped,  as the  ant is not,  for  this
capacity.  Variety and possibility are inherent in the human sensorium-and  are
indeed the key to man's most noble flights-because variety and possibility belong
to the very structure of the human organism. [Wiener 1954, 51-2]
In animals capable of ontogenetic learning, the genes do not transmit the specific behaviors that
might be fitted to certain environment; instead the genes transmit the learning mechanisms to the
offspring.  The animal then interacts with, adapts to, and learns from the environment. In this
manner, the animal can learn much more complex activities in a wide variety of environments
than could possibly be transmitted directly by the genes.  Indeed, the adjectives "direct" and
"indirect" can be used to describe these two approaches to learning.
The gene-pattern, as a store or channel for variety, has limited capacity.  Survival
goes especially to those species that use the capacity efficiently.  It can be used
directly or indirectly.
The direct use occurs when the gene-pattern is used directly to specify the
regulator.  The regulator is made (in the embryo) and the organism passes its life
responding to each disturbance as the gene-pattern has determined....
The  indirect use  occurs  when the  gene-pattern builds  a  regulator  (RI)
whose action is to build the main regulator (R2), especially if this process is raised
through  several orders or levels.  By achieving the ultimate regulation through
stages,  the  possibility  of  large-scale  supplementation  occurs,  and  thus  the
possibility  of an  ultimate regulation far greater than could be  achieved by the
gene-pattern directly. [Ashby 1963, 270-1]
In the indirect case, the first regulator transmitted by the genes is the learning mechanism, and
the second main regulator is the whole set of activities learned by the animal through interaction
with the environment.
[The learning mechanism's] peculiarity is that the gene-pattern delegates part of
its control over the organism to the environment.  Thus, it does not specify in
detail how a kitten shall catch a mouse, but provides a learning mechanism and a
tendency to play, so that it is the mouse which teaches the kitten the finer points
of how to catch mice.
This is regulation, or adaptation, by the indirect method.  The gene-pattern
does not, as it were, dictate, but puts the kitten into the way of being able to form
its own adaptation, guided in detail by the environment. [Ashby 1960, 234]
The direct method (where genes transmit behaviors) and the indirect method (where the genes
transmit a learning capacity) are essentially the genetic versions of two basic pedagogies.  In the
direct method, the teacher transmits knowledge to the passive student who absorbs and uses the
knowledge as needed.  In the indirect method, the teacher fosters and awakens an intrinsic desire
for learning on the part of the learner who then takes the active role in (re)discovering and
appropriating knowledge.  In the indirect method, the teacher does not transmit knowledge, but
"puts the [learner] into the way of being able to form [the learner's] own adaptation, guided in
detail by the environment."  Ortega uses a metaphor similar to Ashby's.
2He who wishes to teach us a truth should not tell it to us, but simply suggest it
with  a brief gesture, a gesture which starts an  ideal trajectory in the air along
which we glide until we find ourselves at the feet of the new truth. ... He who
wants to teach  a truth should place us in the position to  discover it ourselves.
[Ortega 1961, 67]
These two methods are also described in the old Chinese story that giving a man a fish only feeds
him for a day while teaching him how to fish feeds him for a lifetime.  Ashby develops a similar
story.  Suppose that a father only had ten minutes to teach his child the meanings of English
words.  Using the direct method, the father would teach the child the meaning of a certain small
number of words.
The indirect method is for the father to spend the ten minutes showing the child
how to use a dictionary.  At the end of the ten minutes the child is, in one sense,
not  better  off;  for  not  a  single  word  has  been  added  to  his  vocabulary.
Nevertheless the second method has a fundamental advantage; for in the future
the number of words that the child can understand is no longer bounded by the
limit imposed by the ten minutes.  The reason is that if the information about
meanings has to  come through the father directly, it is limited to  ten-minutes'
worth; in the indirect method the information comes partly through the father and
partly through another channel (the dictionary) that the father's ten-minute act has
made available.
In the  same way the  gene-pattern, when it determines the growth  of  a
learning animal, expends part of its resources in forming a brain that is adapted
not only by details in the gene-pattern but also by details in the environment.  The
environment acts like the dictionary.  While the hunting wasp, as it attacks its
prey, is guided in detail by its genetic inheritance, the kitten is taught how to catch
mice by the mice themselves.  Thus in the learning organism the information that
comes to it by the gene-pattern is much supplemented by information supplied by
the environment; so the total adaptation possible, after learning, can exceed the
quantity transmitted directly through the gene-pattern. [Ashby 1960, 236-7]
The Indirect Approach in Social Policies
For examples of an indirect approach in social policies, we might consider a survey of global
trends in economic and social development commissioned by the UNCHS (Habitat) and carried
out by the CERFE group in Rome. The report painstakingly analyzed fifty-eight urban policies.
Generally  speaking, the  overwhelming  majority  of urban  policies  enacted  or
encouraged by governments, local entities and international organizations appear
toa be based on what we might term an indirect approach, which is characterized
by the following:
>  the  tendency  of  public  subjects  to  avoid  direct  intervention  to  resolve
problems or provide services, thus leaving greater room  for action by other
private and collective subjects;
3>  the tendency of public actors to be structured in an effectively decentralized
manner;
>  the growing tendency to resort to a variety of sources of financing, especially
local sources. [CERFE 1995, chapter 1.8]
Thus governments have been turning away from the more customary direct approach which the
report characterized by:
>  exclusive  recourse  to  public  entities  for  the  provision  of  services  and
infrastructure;
>  centralized decision-making authority;
>  near exclusive recourse to public funding for the supply of services and the
construction and maintenance of infrastructure. [CERFE 1995, chapter 1.8]
My purpose here is to try to pull together from antiquity to modern times a wide variety of
strategies and theories that promote an indirect approach to learning, management, developing
critical reason, spiritual progress, and to broader social and institutional change. What are the
basic limitations on direct approaches such as the economic theory of agency, and what are the
underlying reasons for the efficacy of an indirect approach?
Towards  a Critique  of Agency Theory
This emphasis on indirect approaches grows in part out of misgivings with the economic theory
of agency.'  Agency theory focuses on the common situation wherein one person or group, called
the "principal," desires to obtain certain behavior from another person or group called the
"agent." The principal-agent language is borrowed from the legal relationship of agency and is
used in economics in a much broader context. 2 McGregor writing in 1948 before the principal-
agent language was established in the economics and management literature refers to the
principal and agent respectively as "A" and "B": "A always refers to the individual (or group)
who is attempting to induce a behavior change, and B always refers to the individual (or group)
whose behavior is affected." [1948; reprinted in 1966, 155]
Agency theory is based on homo economicus, or in McGregor's terms, on the Theory X view of
people [1960, 1966, 1967]. Positive and negative economic incentives ("carrots and sticks")
must be supplied by the principal to induce the appropriate behavior by the agents. Left to their
own devices, agents cannot be trusted to act in the manner desired by the principal so an
incentive structure must be applied to redirect the agents in the desired manner.  Agency theory
is a sophisticated direct approach.  McGregor's alternative Theory Y is an indirect approach.
Many of the modem management strategies that have grown out of McGregor's classic
formulation of Theory Y will thus have a significant indirect component.  Our purpose is to dig
1 See Ross 1973  and Stiglitz  1974  for early  work. For surveys  and applications,  see  Pratt and Zeckhauser  1991,
Eatwell  et al. 1989,  or the text Campbell  1995. For earlier  critical  analysis  of agency  theory,  see Perrow 1972,
Hirsh et al. 1987,  Pfeffer  1994,  and the references  contained  in Eisenhardt  1989.
2  In the legal  relationship,  the agent  takes  on a legal role  to act in  the interests  of the principal,  but economists  now
use the termninology  in a broader  context  where  the agent  is not necessarily  under  any legal  obligation  to act in the
interests  of the principal.
4into the intellectual background to indirect approaches-which at the same time can be seen as
showing limitations on the strictly economic approach to "agency" relationships.
The direct approach of Theory X and the indirect approach of Theory Y cannot simply be
applied at the same time (although managers often seem to try).  The approaches are more
substitutes than complements but it is not simply a matter of choosing one or the other. It is a
question of foreground and background. The case in favor of a Theory Y approach is not a case
against any carrots or sticks per se, but a case that the carrots and sticks should be kept in the
background as motivational backstops. It is a question of who is in the driver's seat, not who is in
the car.
Piece rates and pay-for-performance schemes are examples of carrots in the foreground trying to
get people's attention and guide their actions.  An equitable salary more geared to experience and
seniority would be an example of keeping the carrot of pay in the background so that other more
intrinsic motives might emerge in the foreground to guide action.  The tight coupling of pay with
performance, as implied whenever possible by agency theory, is beside the point when the pay is
in the background. For instance, Deming's "New Economics" recommends to "Abolish incentive
pay and pay based on performance" [1994, 28], e.g., to pay salespeople by salary rather than by
commission.  Deming recommends replacing a system based on monitoring and quality bonuses
with a system using (for the most part) trust based on self-esteem and pride in the quality of one's
work.  In short, this approach to quality relies not on cleverly constructed pay-for-performance
schedules but on switching over to a quality system driven largely by intrinsic motivators [see
below] such as self-esteem and pride in one's work-in short, quality as a calling.
The Helper-Doer Relationship
The focus will be on the relationship where some party A tries to induce a change in the behavior
or beliefs of another party B.  Sometimes the first party might be called the "principal" and the
second the "agent" in keeping with the idea of exploring Theory Y or indirect approaches to the
agency relationship.  But the agency terninology  is freighted with connotations from economics
and the law that are sometimes inappropriate so I will also use the terminology of A being the
"helper" and B is the "doer" or "doers." Then the Theory Y and indirect approaches fall in line
as ways for "helpers" to help others to help themselves to "do" something, while the Theory X
and direct approaches are ways of influencing others to do something, but not ways of helping
others to become more autonomous. Theory X does not take the autonomy of the agents or doers
as a constraint, not to mention as a goal.
How can helpers provide assistance that is compatible with the autonomy of the doers?  This is
the quintessential problem of autonomy-compatible assistance; how to "help others to help
themselves."  The task is not to "help others"; it is the quite different task of "helping others help
themselves." The notion of an autonomy-compatible assistance has a whiff of paradox since it is
an external intervention that somehow does not override or undercut the other person's internal
locus of causality.  For instance, if the helper has a significant impact, then to what extent are the
5others really "helping themselves," or if they are really helping themselves, then what is the role
of the would-be "helpers"? 3
There is a similar "learning paradox" in pedagogy (that we will explore);  if the teacher "gives"
the knowledge to the student, then the student probably has little understanding or "ownership"
of the knowledge, but if the student actively rediscovers and appropriates the knowledge as his or
her own, then the knowledge does not "come from" the teacher. The various answers to the
problem of autonomy-compatible assistance are all approaches that could be termed "indirect"-
and thus our focus.
At various points, I must ask the basic question: "Why an indirect approach; why not a direct
approach?"  What exactly is the problem with a more direct approach?  There are many answers
or at least answers-in many terminologies. In the language of autonomy, the problems with the
direct approaches are immediate; they cut across the autonomy of the agents or doers.  In a direct
approach (carrots and sticks) the agent is controlled and acted upon; the relationship does not
enable the agent to become more self-acting or autonomous. Only an indirect approach is
compatible with maintaining, if not increasing, the doer's autonomy.
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation
The concepts of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation can be useful in making these distinctions.  An
intrinsically motivated activity is an activity carried out by individuals for its own sake.  The
activity is an end in itself, not an instrumental means to some other end (such as satisfying
biological needs or "tissue deficits"). The factors that determine the meaning of "for its own
sake" are usually based on the self-identity of the person or persons carrying out the activity.  An
intrinsically motivated activity might be accompanied by extrinsic motivators if the latter are not
controlling, i.e., if they do not take over the locus of control.  For instance, professors typically
pursue their professional work for its own sake even though there is a salary and other
emoluments in the background. Indeed much of the story is concerned with the question of the
locus of control for an activity. Autonomous activity has an internal locus of control. A bribe or
threat to get one to do what one would not ordinarily do establishes an external locus of control.
The economic theory of agency works with extrinsic variables such as monetary rewards or
penalties to the agent that the principal can affect and change since the goal of the theory is to
design incentive structures to elicit the desired results from the agent. By following the
incentives provided by the "incentive-compatible" reward scheme, the agent will be led to
achieve the results desired by the principal. From the agent's viewpoint, such an incentive
structure represents extrinsic or external motivation.
3  "It is hard  ... to learn  to accommodate  one's  ends  to those of others;  to adjust,  to give  way here,  and fit in there
with  respect  to our aims. But difficult  as this is, it is easy  compared  with  the difficulty  of acting  in such a way  for
ends  which  are helpful  to others  as will call  out and make  effective  their  activities."  [Dewey  and  Tufts, 1908,  303]
4See  Deci  and Ryan 1985  for  the notion  of locus of causality. They  differentiate  it from  the notion  of locus  of
control  [see  Lefcourt  1976]  as they interpret  the latter  as dealing  with  the outcomes  rather  than sources  of action.
Nevertheless,  one may find  the notion  of "locus  of control"  often  used  to indicate  the source  of actions. We  use the
notions  of having  an internal  locus  of causality,  self-determination,  and  autonomy  as being  synonymous  for our
purposes.
6Money  is  the  most  obvious  [extrinsic  motivator]  but  promotion,  praise,
recognition, criticism,  social acceptance and rejection, and  'fringe benefits'  are
other examples.
'Intrinsic' rewards, on the other hand, are inherent in the activity itself; the reward
is the  achievement.  They  cannot  be  directly controlled  externally,  although
characteristics  of  the  environment  can  enhance  or  limit  the  individual's
opportunities  to  obtain  them.  Thus,  achievement of  knowledge  or  skill,  of
autonomy,  of  self-respect, of  solutions  to  problems are  examples.  [McGregor
1966, 203-4]
There is now a considerable body of literature in psychology, sociology, and organizational
behavior on intrinsic and extrinsic motivation as well as the closely related notions of autonomy,
self-determination, and internal locus of control. 5 Although considerations of intrinsic
motivation have figured prominently in the Romantic critique 6 of classical economics, the topic
has until recently only received sporadic treatment in economics literature. 7 Bruno Frey's recent
Not Justfor  the Money [1997] is the first book-length treatment of the topic of intrinsic
motivation in the economics literature.
Again, the question can be asked: "Why an indirect approach; why not a direct approach?"
Motive is part of action.  If an action has an intrinsic motive, then it cannot be induced by
extrinsic motivation. This is the old "can't buy love" argument in the terminology of intrinsic-
extrinsic motivation.  One can buy "loving behavior" but not love.  The extrinsic motivation is
inconsistent with the condition of being in love.  Any action which involved an intrinsic motive
could not be induced by extrinsic motivations, only a similar behavior. s "Bought love" is a
motivationally inconsistent state: if it is love then it is not "bought" (although money may be
involved incidentally in the background) and if it is bought, then it is only loving behavior.
This "not for sale" argument applies to all non-pecuniary motives, not just to intrinsic
motivations.  McGregor mentions praise and recognition as extrinsic motivators.  Yet "bought
praise" or "bought recognition" would be counterfeit since money payments are not genuine
grounds for giving someone else praise or recognition.  In contrast, there is no contradiction in
paying someone to "prostitute" themselves in certain ways or to undertake a mercenary endeavor
as that motivation is quite consistent with the proposed action.
s See Deci and Ryan 1985,  Elster 1983,  Lane 1991,  Candy 1991,  Kohn 1993,  and Deming 1994.
6  See,  for example,  Ruskin 1985  (1862). Lutz 1999  gives  an integrated  treatment  of Sismondi,  Carlyle,  and  Ruskin.
7See  Titmuss  1970,  Arrow 1972,  Scitovsky  1976,  Hirsch 1976,  Sen 1982,  Schelling  1984,  Akerlof 1984,
Hirschman  1992,  Kreps 1997,  and  Prendergast  1999.
8 A classic  example  where  economics  has ignored  crucial  questions  of motives  for behaviors  is the economic
treatment  of "cooperation"  and "trust"  based  on repeated  prisoner's  dilemma  games  (Axelrod  [1984]  is the locus
classicus). When  a prisoner's  dilemma  game is repeated,  the credible  threat  of being punished  by the other party's
defecting  tomorrow  may elicit  cooperative  behavior  today. But  this sort  of cooperative  behavior  is quite  different
from cooperation  and trust  motivated  by some fellow-feeling  for the other  parties  or some identification  with the
broader  group  which  includes  the other  parties. Institutional  design  based  on threat-induced  "cooperation"  would  be
rather  different  from design  based on fellow-feeling  or identification  where  the penalties  attached  to non-
cooperation  were not eliminated  but played a secondary  role as motivational  backstops.
7Thus one must always match tools to tasks.  The direct approach utilizes certain tools such as the
"carrots and sticks" of agency theory, and yet those tools may be inconsistent with the motives of
the desired actions.  A carrot cannot motivate a non-carrot-driven action.  Such actions require an
indirect approach.
By-Products Rather than Products of Choice
Jon Elster has considered a large class of mental and social "by-product" states that cannot be
brought about by deliberate choice [1983, Chapter II: "States that are Essentially By-Products"].
One cannot "produce" a state that is essentially a by-product,  just as one cannot machine-produce
a handmade artifact. One can only machine-produce counterfeit 'handmade' artifacts.
Imposed "autonomy" and bought "love" are among the examples of motive-inconsistent states.
The principal cannot pay or threaten the agent to have such states as the motive contradicts the
grounds for such states. The problems arise for cognitive states as well as for volitional states.
Belief in some statement P, for example, would be grounded in some reason that could qualify as
grounds for belief.  Getting paid to believe P or believing P for instrumental reasons such as to
attract another person or to be a member of a belief-based organization ("church" 9) are not
among those grounds,"' although they may well be reasons for some "believing behavior."  A
"bought belief'  is the cognitive version of the inconsistency involved in a "bought non-pecuniary
motive" such as "bought love."
Here again, the answer is clear to the question: "Why an indirect approach; why not a direct
approach?" A direct approach may be self-defeating like shining a flashlight to get a better look
at "darkness"; the approach dispels the goal."  A by-product is at best the product of "indirect
means" (Elster 1983, 56].  Mental states and conditions have their antecedents or grounds.  A
direct approach using an instrument that did not fulfill those antecedents or grounds would only
produce a counterfeit state or condition (like a "bought belief').  Only an indirect approach that
tried to foster or to be a midwife to the right conditions or grounds would have a chance of
success.
McGregor's Theory Y: A Prototype Indirect Approach
It is quite instructive to look at the genesis of McGregor's indirect Theory Y. He did not start
with the traditional manager-subordinate relationship but with the relationship between a staff
expert (e.g., in human relations, accounting, finance, engineering, and so forth) who is to help a
line manager with a particular problem.  It is perhaps because the line manager is not subordinate
9 Thus  Milton  [1957  (1659)]  inveighs  against  "hirelings"  in the  Church.
'° "Here  is the  radical  fallacy  of  those  who  urge  that  people  must  use  promises  and  threats  in order  to encourage
opinions,  thoughts,  and  feelings  which  they  think  good,  and  to prevent  others  which  they  think  bad. Promises  and
threats  can influence  acts. Opinions  and  thoughts  on morals,  politics,  and  the rest,  after they  have  once grown  in a
man's  mind,  can  no  more  be influenced  by promises  and  threats  than  can  my  knowledge  that  snow  is  white  or that
ice  is cold."  [Morley  1928,  203]
"  Kierkegaard  used  stories  of putting  a cap  on  a certain  type  of elf  or  putting  special  armor  on  the  god  Mars  to see
how  they  looked,  but  in each  case  the  act  made  them  invisible.  Elster  points  out similar  notions  in Gregory
Batesons  double  bind  theory  [1972]  and  in the  work  of Watzlawick  [1976]  and  Farber  [1976].  See  also  Parfit
[1984]  for  a discussion  of self-defeating  theories.
8to the staff expert that McGregor has to explore indirect approaches: "The function of the staff
expert in human relations is necessarily indirect."' 2 This is the topic in McGregor's 1946 article
"The Staff Function in Human Relations" which even precedes the "Theory X" and "Theory Y"
terminology.  At the end of the article, he muses that this approach might be applied by "the line
manager to his own subordinates" [1946; reprinted in 1966, 170]. McGregor did just that in his
classic presentation of Theory Y in The Human Side of Enterprise [1960].
McGregor describes Theory Y as being based on the principle of integration and self-control" 3
where "integration" refers to the situation where an individual "can achieve his own goals best by
directing his efforts toward the objectives of the enterprise." [1960, 61]  Management's task is
not to provide incentives; the "task is to provide an appropriate environment-one that will permit
and encourage employees to seek intrinsic rewards at work." [1967, 14] The contrasting Theory
X is based on the principle or philosophy of direction and control using the type of incentives
that management can provide, i.e., extrinsic incentives.
I will outline Theory Y in a broader principal-agent setting where the "principal" or "helper" is
trying to help the "agent" or "doer" to accomplish certain tasks.  The general purpose is for the
helper to help the doer or doers to help themselves.  In an organizational setting, the principal
(helper) would have a managerial role, the agent (doer) would be a subordinate (or another
manager as in McGregor's staff-line example), and the tasks would be in furtherance of
organizational goals.
Step 1: Starting  from the doer's problem
The helper starts from the doer's engagement with an organizational problem, a problem that the
helper is to help the doer solve.  The helper is not to start with what the helper as expert thinks is
"the problem."
Step 2: Seeing the problem through the doer's eyes
The helper explores with the doer the problem as perceived by the doer.  How does the doer
perceive and conceptualize the difficulty?  If the helper sees the situation differently then this
should be explained clearly without trying to manipulate the doer's perceptions or impose the
helper's view of the problem.
Step 3: Helping the doer pursue own-ends to best solve the organizational problem
This is the core of the indirectness of the approach.  Starting with the doer's problem within the
organization and seeing the problem through the doer's eyes, the helper can then offer knowledge
and experience to help the doer find the best way to further the doer's own intrinsic ends while
addressing the organizational problem.  The helper is not to "teach" the doer what the helper
12  McGregor 1946, reprinted in 1966, 152.
13  Peter Drucker [1954] developed essentially the same "Theory Y" ideas in his "Management by Objectives
(MBO)" (also called "management by objectives and self-control") approach as opposed to "management by
control" (as noted in McGregor 1966, 15-16 and in Drucker 1973). But the MBO theory was so popularized
(indeed, vulgarized) by Drucker and others apparently in order to reach a mass market that it is commonly
interpreted to mean "management by results" in a manner quite along the lines of Theory X and agency theory.
Hence we will rely more on McGregor's treatment of these ideas.
9considers the best solution.' 4 This is particularly difficult for engineers and economists who
"know" the "one best (or 'optimal') way" to solve the problem.  The helper is to create a learning
situation so that the doer can arrive at what the doer considers to be the best solution to the
problem in view of his own ends and capabilities." 5
A's [Helper's] objective is to utilize his skill to create a situation in which B [doer]
can learn, and to make his knowledge available so that B may utilize it to augment
his  own  need  satisfaction  in  ways  consistent  with  the  achievement  of
organizational objectives. [McGregor 1966, 163]
Fundamentally the staff man... must create a situation in which members of
management can learn, rather than one in which they are taught. [161]
As the arrived-at solution is the fruits of the doer's own labor, the doer has a natural ownership of
it which leads to much more effective implementation (e.g., more effective than the typical
partial, half-hearted, and sullen implementation of the expert's imposed "solution").
If the helper's favored approach or solution is sound, then a learning situation should be feasible
wherein the doer can arrive at it or something close to it. As may be more likely the case, the
helper's favored solution may be incomplete or require adaptation to local circumstances so
"perhaps the greatest challenge in the,methods outlined above [is that] they offer to [helper and
doer] alike a valuable opportunity to learn." [1966, 168]
Step 4: Helping doer to implement, test, and refine the doer's solution
Having worked with the doer to arrive at what the doer considers the best solution, the helper
needs to assist the doer in testing it, refining it, and gaining the skill and self-confidence for full
implementation of the refined solution. This at the same time builds trust on the part of the
helper that the doer will take responsibility for the problem-solving.
Step 5: Helping doer gain autonomy and take responsibility for solution
In this final stage, the helper's goal is to assist the doer to achieve independence ("leave the
nest") and to take full responsibility for the solution and its implementation-as well as for
finding own-solutions to similar problems that might arise in the future. There are two sides to
this "separation" or "leaving the nest" problem: getting the doer to avoid dependency and assume
responsibility, and getting the helper to have the trust to "let go" and to avoid trying to take
responsibility." 6
14 When  the  helper  facilitates  the  doer  finding  a solution  and  refrains  from  "teaching"  or otherwise  imposing  a
solution,  then  the helper  is perhaps  engaging  in "action  by non-action"  (wu-wei)  of Taoist  thought  (see below).
"  In the same  spirit,  George  Bernard  Shaw  quipped  "if you  teach a man anything  he will  never learn  it" [1961, 11]
and Ortega  y Gasset  suggested:  "He who  wants  to teach a truth should  place us in the position  to discover  it
ourselves."  [1961,  67]
16  One common  metaphor  is the two-sided  problem  of the grown  teenager  leaving  the parents'"nest.  "  The  teenager
needs self-confidence  to release  the parental  hand and the parents  need  trust  (and  the willingness  to forsake
dependency  and control)  to let go of the grown  teenager's  hand.
10The helper must avoid the benevolent "giving" of a solution to a grateful doer as that develops
dependency and the doer does not learn to help himself. Just as the doer needs to take
responsibility, the helper needs to avoid trying to "take responsibility."  This is particularly
difficult since helpers have their own bosses or principals so the helper naturally wants to take
ownership of the solution.
If [the helper's] own need for power is too strong, he will not be able to create or
maintain  an effective  relationship with B  [the doer].  If he  is  overanxious for
recognition, he is likely to destroy the results of his work with B by seeking credit
for B's accomplishments. [1966, 167]
This is the classic ownership problem. If the helper takes ownership of the solution in the eyes
of the organization, then we are back in the case where the doers are called upon to implement
someone else's plan with the aforementioned lack of effectiveness.  The helper is never more
successful than when the doer finds the doer's solution."1
Indirect Approaches: Intellectual Background in Antiquity
Indirect approaches in the agent-principal relationship or the helper-doer relationship will be
explored by looking at the history of these diverse but interrelated ideas.
Taoist Antecedents
Direct approaches usually express a controlling and engineering mentality (stereotypically
masculine) often associated with the West, while indirect approaches motivated by organic
nurturing and enabling attitudes (feminine) are associated with the East.  Eastern religions,
particularly Taoism, have some clear early arguments against a direct controlling approach to
human affairs.
For those who would like to take control of the world and act on it-
I see that with this they simply will not succeed.
The world is a sacred vessel;
It is not something that can be acted upon.
Those who act on it destroy it;
Those who hold on to it lose it. [Lao-Tze 1989, Chapter 29]
In contrast, Taoism has the central concept of wu-wei which is variously translated by "action by
inaction" or "effortless action."  Perhaps wu-wei can be best understood as a general metaphor
for the indirect approach.  Certainly the "inaction" implies refraining from direct controlling
actions that, as noted above, may defeat their purpose.  A proper indirect approach by the helper
will enable and enlist the intrinsic motivation and best energies of the doers so that matters will
17  "The successful  psychotherapist  is the one whose  patients  all believe  they cured  themselves-they internalized
the therapy  and it thereby  became  truly  an integral  part of them. Consultants  suffer  much  the same  dilemma  of the
psychotherapist-the  problem  of internalization.  If they wish  the client  to use the right solution  with full and lasting
commitment  then they must let him believe  it is his solution."  [Handy  1993,  145] This echoes  the notion  of the
Taoist  ruler who governs  in such  a way that when  the task is accomplished,  the people  will say "We  have done it
ourselves."  [see  Chapter  17 of Lao-Tzu's  Te-Tao  Ching]
11progress effortlessly on their initiative. A clear example is in learning.  Learning externally
imposed lessons requires quite an effort, but "when I study a subject which I love,-no matter
how many years it takes me to learn it-I never feel that I am making any effort...."  [Smullyan
1977, 161] When the teacher refrains from "teaching" a topic (in the sense of "pumping"
knowledge into the pupil) and instead awakens the learner's interest in the topic so that learning
becomes self-motivated, then that is the wu-wei of the indirect approach on the part of the
teacher-helper.
Applied to government, an interfering and overbearing government will stifle and crowd out the
initiative and self-activity of the people.
The more prohibitions there are, the poorer the people become.
The more sharp weapons there, the greater the chaos in the state.
The more skills of technique, the more cunning things are produced.
The  greater  the  number  of  statutes,  the  greater  the  number  of  thieves  and
brigands.
Therefore the Sage says:
I do nothing and the people are reformed of themselves.
I love quietude and the people are righteous of themselves.
I deal in no business and the people grow rich by themselves.
I have no desires and the people are simple and honest by themselves. [Lin 1948,
Chapter 57 of the Te-Tao Ching]
Thus the best wu-wei of the government is that which best enables the people to help themselves
(which is not necessarily laissez  faire).
The Socratic Method
In the West, we may start the history of the indirect approach with Socrates (469-399 BC).
Socrates did not teach, but those who engaged him in dialogue were engaged in learning.  He had
no writings, and the systemic doctrines expressed in the Platonic dialogues seem to be more
attributable to Plato.  Socrates was the quintessential helper whose aim was to help others, the
doers, to learn to think for themselves.  Most people think rather passively reflecting external
opinions and values.  Socrates exemplified critical reason that could take up the common
opinions and values and critically examine them. But he did so in an indirect way by asking
questions which would spur the learners to re-examine their own thoughts.
As in McGregor's initial steps, the helper should not "preach the Truth" but should start where
the doer is, see the situation through the doer's eyes, and activate the doer's own energies in
addressing the problem.
If education is understood in the Socratic way, as an eliciting of the soul's own
activity, it is natural to conclude, as Socrates concludes, that education must be
very personal.  It must be concerned with the actual situation of the pupil, with the
current state of the pupil's knowledge and beliefs, with the obstacles between the
12pupil and  the  attainment of self-scrutiny and  intellectual  freedom.  [Nussbaum
1997, 32]
It is important to understand that Socrates' direct goal was not the transmission of truth;
otherwise the Sophists' lectures or sermons might have been the chosen pedagogical device
rather than dialogue.  Socrates' goal was not to instill a specific set of doctrines in his pupils (a
temptation Plato could not resist) but to enable them to employ their critical reason so that after
critically reexamining themselves during the dialogue and thereafter, the pupils would have
"ownership" of the results.  By living the examined life of reason, the learners would come to
know themselves and to be autonomous.
As Socrates' goal was not to transmit specific doctrines, he (unlike the Sophists) always
professed what is now known as "Socratic ignorance."  Since he did not 'know',"s  he would have
to constantly ask questions to better elucidate the topic.' 9 The purpose of the questions was not
for Socrates to find answers for himself but to get the pupils to think for themselves.  Thus
Socratic questioning is an indirect method, a method designed not to better control and instruct
the student, but a method designed to self-activate the learner during the dialogue and perhaps
thereafter.  Socrates aimed not to be the "Father of Truth" but the midwife of critical reason.
The Socratic teacher is described not only as a coach, a catalyst, or a midwife but as a "brooder"
both in the sense of one who meditates about questions but as a hen brooding over her eggs and
chicks.  Scott Buchanan, the Socratic architect of the renowned learning program at St. John's
College (Annapolis, MD), describes the Socratic teacher as:
knowing more than the pupil does, yet in some sense not conveying it but seeing
that it is made available to the pupil.  The great use of superior knowledge is to
understand what the pupil is learning as it is learned.  It takes great wisdom to be
able to follow a learning pupil sensitively enough to know what the next step is
for him, and you don't press the next step.  You watch it happen.  If it sticks, you
help it a bit, but it's not a transmission or an imposition or a filling of a vessel of
any of those things.  Those are all bad images of the real teaching function: the
real one is this penetration of the intelligence, of one intelligence into another.
[Buchanan 1970, 51]
This view of the Socratic role of the teacher also follows from the constructivist pedagogy of
Jean Piaget's genetic epistemology [e.g., Piaget 1955, 1970].
To  summarize what  Piaget said about active methods, he pointed  out that  the
criterion of what makes an "active" method active is not the external actions of
18 This  too was ancient  Eastern  wisdom. "When  you  know a thing, to recognize  that you  know it, and when  you do
not know a thing, to recognize  that  you  do not know it. That is knowledge."  [Confucius,  Analects,  Book II, 17] "To
know you don't  know is best. Not to know you  don't  know is a flaw."  [Lao-Tzu,  Te-Tao  Ching,  Chapter  71]
'9 Clearly Socrates  used considerable  knowledge  to ask  the appropriate  questions,  so one might  quip  that it takes  a
lot of knowledge  to be as 'ignorant'  as Socrates.  However,  in the questions  of human  affairs,  there is little reason
then or now for this 'ignorance'  or intellectual  humility  to be just ironic. A common  perversion  is the pseudo-
Socratic  method  employed  by someone  who  has already  decided  upon  the answer  and is only  trying  to ask leading
questions  to bring the listeners  to the same  conclusion.  As always,  the difference  is between  the  helper  controlling
('helping')  the doers  or enabling  the doers  to better  help themselves.
13the learner.  He said,  for example, that  Socrates used an  active method  with
language and that the  characteristic of the  Socratic method was to  engage the
learner in actively constructing his own knowledge.  The task of the teacher is to
figure out what the learner already knows and how he reasons in order to ask the
right question at the right time so that the learner can build his own knowledge.
[Kamii 1973, 203]
The Path of Stoicism
Many paths diverged from Socrates and Plato: Aristotle and his school, the Skeptics, the
Epicureans, and the Stoics.  For the purposes of understanding indirect approaches, the golden
thread runs through the Greek and Roman Stoicism of Chrysippus, Cleanthes, Zeno, Seneca,
Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius (although the thread of neo-Platonism will be picked up later).
In this example of the helper-doer relationship, Socrates is replaced by the Stoic teacher who
functions as a physician for the soul of his interlocutors, the doers who seek to follow this path.
Again the teacher must start with the particular situation of the doer and see the situation through
the doer's eyes in order to be more helpful.
Just as it is appropriate for the [physician] of the body to be "inside" as they say,
the affections... that befall the body and the therapeutic treatment that is proper to
each, so it is the task of the physician of the soul to be "inside" both of these, in
the best possible way. [Chrysippus, quoted in Nussbaum 1994, 328-9]
In order to better engage the self-activity of the student, the teacher focuses on practical
problems, not abstract philosophical themes. 20 The use of concrete examples and stories serve
the same end.
Yet a problem did arise in the transition from Socrates to the Stoics, a problem that has and
perhaps will always tend to undermine the strengths of the indirect approach. Epigrams, sayings,
and writings accumulated from the sages of the past.  Instead of developing their own critical
facilities or the autonomy of their wills, students could now memorize the "lessons" of Socrates
and the previous Stoic philosophers and then regurgitate them with flourish and skill to become
'sages' themselves.  For this modus operandi, no indirect pedagogy was needed; the direct
approach of indoctrination in the "lessons" and "great books" of the past would suffice. Thus
one finds Epictetus (55-135 AD) going to great lengths verbally lambasting his students for these
pretensions.  Seneca (1-65 AD) likewise chides his correspondent Lucilius on the desire to
accumulate sayings.
It is disgraceful that a man who is old or in sight of old age should have a wisdom
deriving solely from his notebooks.  'Zeno said this.'  And what have you said?
20  The  theme  that  practicality  was  the  road  to engaging  the  interest  and  initiative  of the  students  played  a major  role
more  recently  in John  Dewey's  pragmatic  philosophy  of education.  Interpreters  of Dewey's  pedagogy  often  think
that  his  purpose  was  to urge  'practical  training"  rather  than  to simply  use  practical  problems  as  the  source  of  student
engagement  so  that  the  student's  faculties  of  critical  reason  and  social  sympathy  would  be improved  through  active
use.
14'Cleanthes said that.'  What have you said?  How much longer are you going to
serve under others' orders?
To remember is to safeguard something entrusted to your memory, whereas to
know,  by  contrast,  is  actually  to  make  each  item  your  own,  and  not  to  be
dependent on some original and be constantly looking to see what the master said.
[Seneca 1969, Letter 33]
In the same spirit, Martha Nussbaum today chides those who would erect "The Great Books" as
authorities to be learned, revered, and deferred to, and suggests a "more Senecan title, such as
'Some useful and nourishing books that are likely to help you think for yourself"  [1997, 35].
The goal of the indirect method is the self-transformation of the learner, not to make the learner
into "an instrument for what others have to say" [Seneca, Letter 33]. But the written word (or
remembered spoken word) always provides the temptation to revert to the easier direct method of
teaching so that the pupils might at least display some of the outward behavior that might
accompany self-transformation. 2'
Learning in Neo-Platonism
There is a stream of thought supporting indirect methods that comes from Plato more than
Socrates. Plato argued that, as is seen most clearly in mathematics, concepts do not come from
experience but arise within the mind itself. The Platonic Ideas or Forms are innate in the mind
and arise in consciousness through a process of recollection or reminiscence perhaps prompted
by our sense experience. The theme of innate mental structures and mechanisms triggered-but
not controlled-by experience has percolated down through Western thought (e.g., Plotinus,
Augustine, the Cambridge Platonists, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, and Humboldt) to find its most
sophisticated modem expression in the constructivist pedagogy of genetic epistemology [e.g.,
Piaget 1955, 1971] and the school of generative linguistics [e.g., Chomsky 1966].
For our purposes, it is sufficient to see how the theory of the mind as an active generative organ
supports the indirect approach, while the opposing theory of the mind as a passive tabula rasa or
wax block supports the direct approach. Plato has some passive images of the mind as a wax
block (Theaetetus 191-5) or a mirror or reflector (Timaeus 71). But Socrates (Symposium 175d)
noted that wisdom was not the sort of thing that could flow as through pipes "from the one that
was full to the one that was empty."  In a direct statement about education, Plato uses the cave
allegory where the soul turns away from the shadows to see the Forms.
If this is true, then, we must conclude that education is not what it is said to be by
some, who profess to put knowledge into a soul which does not possess it, as if
they could put sight into blind eyes.  On the contrary, our own account signifies
that the soul of every man does possess the power of learning the truth and the
organ to see it with; and that, just as one might have to turn the whole body round
in order that the eye should see light instead of darkness, so the entire soul must
21  This tendency to subvert indirect in favor of direct methods is greatly aggravated by two more modem
developments: teachers becoming employees of educational establishments who are held "responsible" for their
students' progress [see McClintock 1982] and "evaluation" techniques geared to outward performance.
15be turned away from this changing world, until its eye can bear to contemplate
reality and that  supreme splendour which we have called the Good. [Republic
518]
In Plotinus the Platonic process of recollection becomes an explicitly active process represented
by metaphors such as an overflowing fountain or a radiating light.
In discussing the human perception of the divine overflow,  Plotinus  explicitly
rejected the concept of sensations as 'imprints' or 'seal-impressions' made  on a
passive mind, and substituted the view of the mind as an act and a power which
'gives a radiance out of its own store' to the objects of sense. [Abrams 1953, 59]
The opposing metaphors of the mind as a passive mirror or as an active lamp correlate with two
opposite pedagogies.  One pedagogy sees the student as being essentially passive: a wax tablet
on which knowledge is stamped, a mirror or reflector for knowledge (Plato, Locke), a vessel or
cistern into which knowledge is poured (Cudworth,  22 Coleridge, Dewey), a phonographic record
onto which knowledge is recorded (Dewey, Gramsci, Ryle), and so forth.  The teacher supplies
the knowledge that is imprinted into the student, crammed into the student as into a bag
(Maritain), forced into the student through a "funnel" (Buber), drilled into the student as into
hard and resisting rock (Dewey), or forced into the student using a "grease gun" (McGregor).
The other pedagogy sees the student's mind as taking a more active role represented by
metaphors such as lamp, fountain, or projector-or often by organic metaphors of a growing
plant.  The teacher then has a more subtle indirect role of a guide, coach, or midwife to foster and
nurture the student's active search for and appropriation of knowledge.  Some of the subtlety of
the teacher's indirect role can be expressed using the metaphor of the internal fountain.  External
pressure can obscure or block the flow of the fountain (like turning off a faucet or hose).
External help can then unblock the fountain or open the faucet but the subtle point is that
external help cannot directly supply the pressure to make the fountain flow. That pressure has to
come from within. 23
The Learning Paradox and Augustine
The insights of a philosophical tradition are sometimes expressed in a deliberately provocative
slogan, epigram, or paradox.  One of the striking epigrams of neo-Platonism is the thesis that "no
man ever does or can teach another anything." [Burnyeat 1987, 1] This epigram is a variation on
Meno's Paradox or the Learning Paradox. In the Meno dialogue, Socrates attempts to indirectly
22  For instance,  the Cambridge  Platonist  Ralph Cudworth  writing  in the late 1600's  noted that "knowledge  was not
to be poured  into  the soul like  liquor,  but rather  to be invited  and gently  drawn  forth from it; nor the mind so much
to be filled  therewith  from without,  like  a vessel,  as to be kindled  and awakened."  [1996,  78] Cudworth  also  saw
clearly  the active  nature  of learning:  "knowledge  is an inward  and active energy  of the mind  itself,  and the
displaying  of its own innate  vigour  from within,  whereby  it doth  conquer,  master,  and command  its objects...  ."  [73]
23 This can't-push-on-a-string  asymmetry  was reflected  in our previous  discussion  of extrinsic  and intrinsic
motivation. Extrinsic  motivation  can override  and crowd  out intrinsic  motivation  to control  behavior,  but removing
the former  will not automatically  supply  the latter. One cannot  extrinsically  bring about  intrinsically-motivated
action  just as opening  a faucet  cannot itself  supply  water  pressure. The oft-repeated  ("war-horse")  metaphor  for this
insight  is: "[W]hile  we may lead a horse  to water  we cannot  make  him drink"  [Dewey  1916,  26].
16'teach' a slave boy some truths of geometry.  Socrates claims that people cannot be directly
taught such truths, they must recollect them.
Meno: I see, Socrates.  But what do you mean when you say that we don't learn
anything, but that what we call learning is recollection? Can you teach me that it
is so?
Socrates: I have just said that you're a rascal, and now you ask me if I can teach
you, when I say there is no such thing as teaching, only recollection.  Evidently
you want to catch me contradicting myself straight-away. [Meno 81  e-82a]
One interpretation of Meno's Paradox is that a priori truths such as the truths of geometry must
be recollected since no amount of empirical investigation can verify the truths of mathematics.
But that is a paltry interpretation; Augustine (who 'Christianized' neo-Platonism) and others gave
a stronger interpretation to the claim that "no man ever does or can teach another anything."
In De Magistro (The Teacher), Augustine developed an argument (in the form of a dialogue with
his son Adeodatus) that as teachers teach, it is only the student's internal appropriation of what is
taught that gives understanding and knowledge.
Then those who are called pupils consider within themselves whether what has
been  explained  has  been  said  truly;  looking  of  course  to  that  interior  truth,
according to the measure of which each is able.  Thus they learn,....  But men are
mistaken, so that they call those teachers who are not, merely  because for the
most  part there  is  no  delay  between the  time  of  speaking  and  the  time  of
cognition.  And since after the speaker has reminded them, the pupils  quickly
learn within, they think that they have been taught outwardly by him who prompts
them. [De  Magistro, Chapter XIV]
The basic point is the active role of the mind in generating understanding. This is clear even at
the simple level of understanding spoken words.  We hear the 'auditory sense data' of words in a
completely strange language as well as the words in our native language.  But the strange words
'bounce off our minds with no resultant understanding while the words in a familiar language
prompt an internal process of generating a meaning so that we understand the words.
There are many variations on this theme of the active mind in understanding. John Dewey made
a point about ideas that is similar to the Learning Paradox, a point that supported Dewey's active
learning pedagogy.
It is that no thought, no idea, can possibly be conveyed as an idea from one person
to another.  When it is told, it is, to the one to whom it is told, another given fact,
not an idea.  The communication may stimulate the other person to realize the
question for himself and to think out a like idea, or it may smother his intellectual
interest and suppress his dawning effort at thought. [Dewey 1916, 159]
The common element in the various interpretations of the general learning paradox, "no man
ever does or can teach another anything," is that the external transmission from the speaker-
17teacher to the listener-learner does not itself account for the active role of the mind in generating
an understanding of what was received. The external transmission prompts and guides the
internal process; the internal processing appropriates what is received and makes it our own.
The "Augustinian point" is that what is often taken as a "direct process" (e.g., transmitting or
disseminating knowledge) is actually a more indirect process.  Today, "knowledge processes" in
organizations are constantly designed using "transmission" images of direct methods when in
fact a more subtle understanding and implementation of indirect methods would yield a better
chance of success.
Modern Variations on the Indirect Approach
Rousseau's  Copernican  Revolution  in Pedagogy
Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955) asks what has been the "great historic advance in pedagogy" and he
answers that it was the turning inspired by "Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Froebel, and German
idealism."  Before pedagogy had focused on the teacher and on the subject matter, but with
Rousseau the themes known today as self-direction, autonomy, active learning, and learner-
centered education came to the forefront.  "The innovation of Rousseau and his successors was
simply to shift the center of gravity of the science from knowledge and the teacher to the learner,
recognizing that it is the learner and his characteristics which alone can guide us in our effort to
make something organic of education." [Ortega 1966, 46]
The helper's assistance is often incompatible with the autonomy of the doers because the help is
undertaken in the spirit and conception of social engineering. The success of the natural sciences
from Galileo and Newton through the Enlightenment to understand and control Nature inspired
attempts in the developing psychological, social, political, and economic sciences to similarly
"engineer" social outcomes.  Although ancient civilizations had their "social engineers," the new
aspect was "that the engineering paradigm now becomes a highly conscious, central paradigm.
There is the growing conviction that the only real problems of men are precisely those amenable
to an engineering approach." [Schwartz 1978, 1941 The "Romantic" reaction to this technocratic
strand of Enlightenment thought can be traced to Rousseau.
Here again we see the two theories of the mind represented by the two metaphors of the mirror
and the lamp [Abrams 1953]. Locke saw the mind as beginning with a tabula rasa receiving and
mirroring elementary sensations that were with experience and education associated into more
complex mental structures. This "mirror" approach lent itself easily to social engineering as seen
for example in the later development of behaviorism.  Descartes, following the Platonic tradition,
saw the mind as a lamp endowed with innate structures that unfold and mature under the impact
of experience and through the stimulus of action.  Rousseau developed a version of the "lamp"
theory although he was more given to organic metaphors of natural growth assisted by
appropriate care.
Learning is an active growth, not the accretion of layers as in the "growth" of a pearl.  Pedagogy
based explicitly or implicitly on the engineering approach sees the teacher as actively depositing
new layers of knowledge rather than seeing the learner as taking the active role growing new
18layers of understanding.  A teacher might take pride at explaining everything thoroughly for the
student, but that crowds out an active role for the student.
Talent at instruction consists in making the disciple enjoy the instruction.  But in
order for him to enjoy it, his mind must not remain so passive at everything you
tell him that he has absolutely nothing to do in order to understand you.  The
master's amour-propre must always leave some hold for the disciple's; he must be
able to say to himself, "I conceive, I discern, I act, I learn." [Rousseau 1979, 248]
This problem is repeated manyfold when administrations in schools want their staff (teachers or
task managers) to "show results" which in turn leads to those helpers taking an instrumental or
engineering approach in their assistance to the ultimate doers [see McClintock 1982].  The end
result is that the doers' amour-propre, pride, and ownership is crowded out and overridden so
they cannot say "I conceive, I discern, I act, I learn."
Ortega also mentions Pestalozzi (1746-1827) and Froebel (1782-1852) as continuing to
emphasize a learner-centered pedagogy in Rousseau's tradition. Indeed, Pestalozzi's work
"contains ideas not yet realized in our time, namely, that education of both young and adults is
ineffective unless it grows out of the initiative of the people themselves, unless it speaks their
language, and unless it influences not only isolated individuals but the life of the whole
community." [Ulich 1954, 480]
In addition to being known as the founder of Kindergarten, Froebel has been hailed as "the
prophet of the active nature of the learning process." [cited in Lawrence 1970, 244]  Froebel
made the self-activity of the learner the central theme of his pedagogy: "To stir up, to animate, to
awaken, and to strengthen, the pleasure and power of the human being to labour uninterruptedly
at his own education, has become and always remained the fundamental principle and aim of my
educational work." [Froebel 1954, 525] With Froebel, we also see the emphasis on intrinsic
motivation for autonomous learning activities.  "Froebel's self-activity is necessarily coupled
with joy on the part of the child. To him joy is the inward reaction of self-activity." [translator's
note cited in: Ulich 1954, 557] The role of intrinsic motivation in active learning foreshadows
the modern literature on the limitations of external motivators in education [e.g., Kohn 1993] and
in work [e.g., McGregor and Deming, not to mention Ruskin]-a  theme that helps account for
the general ineffectiveness of direct methods in fostering mental transformation.
John Dewey and the Active Learning Pedagogy
John Dewey's (1859-1952) theory of education was based on the autonomy-compatible actions
of the teacher and the activist role of the learner.  As noted above in the context of the learning
paradox in Augustinian neo-Platonism, Dewey notes that no idea "can possibly be conveyed as
an idea from one person to another" and he evokes the horse-to-water metaphor.  The reliance on
extrinsic rewards or punishments, not to mention physical control, may yield conforming
behavior but has little educative effect.  Indeed, the threat to autonomy may lead to an adverse
reactance effect.  "His instincts of cunning and slyness may be aroused, so that things henceforth
appeal to him on the side of evasion and trickery more than would otherwise be the case."
[Dewey 1916, 26] An autonomy-compatible educational program needs to engage the person's
more natural and intrinsic motivation.
19When we confuse a physical with an educative result, we always lose the chance
of enlisting the person's own participating disposition in getting the result desired,
and thereby of developing within him an intrinsic and persisting direction in the
right way. [271
The students' active interest and involvement is a necessary component so one must consider the
roots of engagement. Students do not construct knowledge in a void.  Learning is contextual; it
builds upon the context of previous knowledge, experience, and problems. Hence Dewey's
"pragmatic" emphasis was placed on learning in the context of the "social environment," albeit
simplified and ordered in a school, so that the student would have a natural or intrinsic incentive
to learn.  Hence Paulo Freire's emphasis on dialogue as the prelude to, as well as the means of,
learning [1970]. By formulating a literacy campaign in terms of the peasants' daily concerns, the
peasants are motivated to be involved and take ownership of the process.  The cases, examples,
and questions can be couched in terms that make sense from the student's viewpoint and are
relevant to the student's interests.  With this preparation, the student can take responsibility for
actively reconstructing and appropriating knowledge with occasional prodding and questioning
from the teacher as midwife.  Knowledge obtained in this active way is truly the student's own; it
is neither an imposition nor a gift.  In general, one may try to "give" help to others or to impose
"help," but in neither case are the others helping themselves.  The latter requires indirect
methods.
The most common error in an educational effort is for the one with superior knowledge (the
teacher) to try to impose or imprint knowledge on the one with less knowledge of the relevant
sort (assisted by manipulated rewards and punishments). These pedagogical errors are aided and
abetted by the Lockean epistemology which sees the mind as a passive waxed tablet upon which
knowledge may be imprinted. Another common error is to think that the alternative role for the
teacher is passivity (leaving the children to "free play").  Between these poles lies the autonomy-
compatible modes of interaction that is Dewey's "direction by indirection."  [Westbrook 1991,
107]
When the parent or teacher has provided the conditions which stimulate thinking
and  has  taken  a  sympathetic attitude  toward  the  activities  of  the  learner  by
entering into a common or conjoint experience, all has been done which a second
party can do to instigate learning.  The rest lies with the one directly concerned.
...  This does not mean that the teacher is to stand off and look on; the alternative
to furnishing ready-made subject matter and listening to the accuracy with which
it is reproduced is not  quiescence, but participation, sharing, in an activity.  In
such shared activity, the teacher is a learner, and the learner is, without knowing
it, a teacher-and  upon the whole, the less consciousness there is, on either side,
of either giving or receiving instruction, the better. [Dewey 1916, 160]
Martin Buber also tries to capture the subtlety of "direction by indirection" in his description of
the relationship between educator and pupil.
20For if the educator of our day has to act consciously he must nevertheless do it "as
though he did not."  That raising of the finger, the questioning glance, are his
genuine doing.  Through  him the selection of the  effective world reaches  the
pupil.  He fails the recipient when he presents this selection to him with a gesture
of interference.  It must be concentrated in him; and doing out of concentration
has the  appearance  of rest.  Interference divides the  soul  in his  care  into  an
obedient part and a rebellious part.  But a hidden influence proceeding from his
integrity has an integrating force. [Buber 1965, 90]
Such an indirect autonomy-respecting interaction 24 is even more subtle when all parties
concerned are adults with their own past education and formative life experiences.
Carl Rogers' Non-Directive Therapy
The next example of an indirect approach comes from Carl Rogers' notion of client-centered
therapy [Rogers 195  1]-which  was also called "nondirective" theory echoing Dewey's notion of
direction by indirection. The temptation for the therapist, as for the teacher and manager, is to
"take charge" and to try to "produce" the right results.  And as in the other cases, this overbearing
approach cuts across the other person's internal resources for self-directed activities.  On the
other hand, a complete laissez-faire or hands-off approach would lead to no interaction rather
than an autonomy-compatible interaction (a charge sometimes leveled against non-directive
therapy).  One key for the therapist, as for the educator, is to see the world through the client's
eyes.
This formulation would state that it is the counselor's function to assume, in so far
as he is able, the internal frame of reference of the client, to perceive the world as
the client sees it, to perceive the client himself as he is seen by himself, to  lay
aside all perceptions from the external frame of reference while doing so, and to
communicate something of this empathic understanding to the client. [29]
The client-centered therapist must guard against this "empathy" being used as a gimmick to
control the patient "while pretending to let him guide himself'  [30] just as the Theory Y manager
needs to avoid seeing "participation" as a tool to get worker "buy-in" to management decisions.
The basis in all cases is the respect for the autonomy of the client (student or worker):
the sincere  aim of  getting  "within" the attitudes of the  client, of  entering the
client's internal frame of reference, is the most complete implementation which
has thus far been formulated, for the central hypothesis of respect for and reliance
upon the capacity of the person. [36]
24  Ortega  makes  a similar  point. "It is a magisterial  forest;  old, as teachers  should  be, serene  and complex. In
addition  it practices  the pedagogy  of suggestion,  the only  delicate  and profound  pedagogy. He who  wishes  to teach
us a truth should  not tell it to us, but simply  suggest  it with  a brief  gesture,  a gesture  which starts  an ideal trajectory
in the air along which  we glide until  we find  ourselves  at the feet  of the new truth." [1961,  67]
21The therapist's role is to be a "catalyzer of change, rather than a director, controller, or external
motivator... In terms of causality..., the goal of therapy is to be a strengthening of one's
autonomy orientation, that is, one's capacity to be self-determining." [Deci and Ryan 1985, 291]
Rogers applies the client-centered approach to education where it becomes "Student-Centered
Teaching" [chapter 9 of Rogers 1951], which acknowledges the debt to Dewey and develops the
same themes and even some of the same metaphors ("You can lead a horse to water...").  Rogers
also pointed out the connection to management theory.
The grounds for the theory of administration which McGregor calls "Theory Y"
have  been  exemplified  in  all  of  the  preceding  chapters  of  this  book.  The
assumptions  on  which  this  theory  is  based,  the kinds  of  evidence from  the
behavioral sciences which support it, the view of human nature which permeates
it, constitute the backbone of what I have set forth. [Rogers 1969, 207]
S0ren Kierkegaard and Ludwig Wittgenstein on Indirect Communication
Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) was the philosopher of the indirect approachpar  excellence.
His approach to philosophical persuasion was steeped in indirect Socratic irony and his main
message was that all direct objective approaches to spiritual insight must fall short; only
subjective inwardness could appropriate the truth about questions of moral or spiritual value.
For example, can he directly inform and persuade a conventional "Christian" that he is only
under an illusion of being a Christian?
No, an illusion can never be destroyed directly, and only by indirect means can it
be radically removed.  If it is an illusion that all are Christians-and  if there is
anything  to  be  done  about  it,  it  must  be  done  indirectly,  not  by  one  who
vociferously proclaims himself an extraordinary Christian, but by one who, better
instructed,  is  ready to  declare that  he  is not  a  Christian at  all  [as  S.K. did
ironically in:  1992, 466].  ...A  direct attack  only strengthens a  person in  his
illusion, and at the same time embitters him. ...And this is what a direct attack
achieves, and it implies moreover the presumption of requiring a man to make to
another person,  or  in  his  presence,  an  admission  which  he  can  make  most
profitably to himself privately.  This is what is achieved by the indirect method
which,  loving  and serving  the truth, arranges everything  dialectically for the
prospective captive, and then shyly withdraws (for love is always shy), so as not
to witness the admission which he makes to himself alone before God-that he has
lived hitherto in an illusion. [Kierkegaard in: Bretall 1946, 332]
Kierkegaard's main point was not just about the indirectness of persuading others but about the
utter subjectivity of moral or spiritual insight even for oneself so that all direct objective or
intellectual ("speculative") approaches were doomed to fail and could only produce a counterfeit
approximation to insight. He poses the learning paradox about the extent to which truths,
spiritual Truth in his case, can be learned from others.  He reviews the old doctrine of
recollection according to which "the Truth is not introduced into the individual from without, but
was within him all the time." [in Bretall 1946, 155] Hence these matters need to be
communicated indirectly or maieutically (as by a Socratic midwife).
22The fact that several of Plato's dialogues end with no conclusion has a far deeper
reason than I had earlier thought.  For this is a reproduction of Socrates' maieutic
skills, which activate the reader or listener himself, and therefore end not in any
conclusion but  with  a sting.  This is  an excellent parody  of the modem  rote-
learning method that says everything at once and the quicker the better, which
does not awaken the reader to any self-activity, but only allows him to recite by
heart. [SK's Journals VII I A 74; quoted in Storm 1999, 11]
Kierkegaard also gives a spiritual interpretation of "Socratic ignorance" as the recognition that
this inward subjective truth cannot be obtained objectively or speculatively.
We noted previously that actions have motives and beliefs have grounds. Kierkegaard is making
the point that intrinsically motivated actions and inwardly subjective beliefs cannot be
extrinsically or objectively obtained just as love cannot be bought.  "But to be a lover, a hero,
etc. is reserved specifically for subjectivity, because objectively one does not become that. ...
And ... piety is rooted precisely in subjectivity; one does not become pious objectively." [1992,
132] It is not the "what" of one's beliefs that counts-as that can be learned by rote-but the "how"
of the beliefs, i.e., how the beliefs were subjectively appropriated. For instance, Kierkegaard
satirizes an orthodox "Christian" gentleman who:
does everything in the name of Jesus and uses Christ's name on every occasion as
a sure sign that he is a Christian and is called to defend Christendom in our day-
and he has no intimation of the little ironic secret that a person, just by describing
the "how" of his inwardness, can indirectly indicate that he is a Christian without
mentioning Christ's name. ...If anyone says, "Yes, but then one can in turn learn
the 'how' of faith by rote and recite it," the answer to that must be: That cannot be
done, because the person who states it directly contradicts himself,....  [O]ne
human being cannot directly communicate this something else to another. ...  All
ironic observing is a matter of continually paying attention to the "how," whereas
the honorable gentleman with whom the ironist has the honor  of dealing pays
attention only to the "what." [1992, 613-4 and footnote]
In this sketch, no attempt is being made to capture the richness and scope of Kierkegaard's
philosophical psychology or the particulars of his treatment of Christianity.  For our purposes, he
was the quintessential philosopher of the inner life; indeed he was obsessed with the
juxtapositions of the outer to the inner, the external to the internal, the objective to the subjective.
In so doing, he saw clearly that the usual direct methods for dealing with the outer, external, and
objective aspects of the world would not extend to the other side; indirect methods were needed
to deal with the inner, the internal, and the subjective. Attempts to apply the direct methods to
subjective transformation would only produce inauthentic counterfeits.
Kierkegaard is widely considered as one of the founders of existentialism, but it is quite relevant
to our theme to see the influence on Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951). By analyzing
Wittgenstein's intellectual and social background in early 20th  century Vienna, Stephen Toulmin
has persuasively argued for a more Kierkegaardian interpretation (with significant influence also
23from Schopenhauer and Tolstoy) than the conventional interpretations of the early Wittgenstein
as a logical positivist or the later Wittgenstein as an ordinary language philosopher.  This
Kierkegaardian reading is important to understand the enigmatic ending of the Tractatus [1922]:
"Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." Wittgenstein, like Kierkegaard, strictly
separated the objective world of facts from the subjective world of moral and aesthetic values.
In  separating  reason  from  fantasy,  the  mathematical  representation  of  the
physicist from the metaphor  of the poet,  straight-forward descriptive  language
from  "indirect communication," Wittgenstein was convinced that he had  solved
"the problem of philosophy." [that is, in the Tractatus]...  The implication of the
model theory was that the "meaning of life" lay outside the sphere of what could
be  said;....  So  the  model  theory  corroborates Kierkegaard's  notion  that  the
meaning of life is not a topic which can be discussed by means of the categories
of reason.
Subjective truth is communicable only indirectly, through fable, polemics,
irony, and  satire.  This  is the only way that  one can come  to  "see the world
aright."  Ethics is taught not by arguments, but by providing examples of moral
behavior;  this  is the task  of art.  It  is fulfilled in Tolstoy's  later  Tales, which
explain what religion is, by showing how the truly religious man lives his life.
[Janik and Toulmin 1973, 198]
In a December 1929 conversation, Wittgenstein made the explicit connection to Kierkegaard.
Nevertheless, we run up against the limits of language.  This running-up-against
Kierkegaard also saw, and indicated in a completely similar way-as  running up
against the Paradox.  This running up against the limits of language is Ethics.  I
regard it as of great importance, that one should put an  end to all the twaddle
about ethics-whether it is a science, whether values exist, whether the Good can
be  defined, etc.  In  ethics people  are forever trying to  find  a  way  of  saying
something which, in the nature of things, is not and can never be expressed.  We
know a  priori: anything which one might  give by way of  an definition of the
Good-it can never be anything but a misunderstanding....  [reported in: Waismann
1967, 68-9; quoted in Janik and Toulmin 1973, 194-5]
In the turn from the early to the later Wittgenstein, his doubts about the efficacy of direct
communication in ethical and aesthetic matters spread, albeit for different reasons, to
descriptions of the world.  Instead of mirroring or picturing facts, language acquired its meaning
by its use in inherently social forms of life.  When removed out of its embedding in such a
language game, an expression might have many interpretations and might cause undue
philosophical problems when it is assumed to have a meaning in a very different game.
Wittgenstein would use indirect methods of stories and fables to dissolve philosophical problems
resulting from lifting language from one form of life to another.
What  Tolstoy's  Tales  had  done  for  the  unsayable  in  ethics,  these  fables  of
Wittgenstein's  did  for  the  unsayable  in  the  philosophy  of  language.  So,  in
philosophy as in ethics, Wittgenstein believed, teaching could bring a man only to
24a point at which he recognized what you were getting at, for himself; and it was
no good attempting to draw an explicit conclusion for him. [Janik and  Toulmin
1973, 229]
This is expressed in the war-horse aphorism about the indirect way that "You can lead a horse to
water but... ".
Wittgenstein's theory of meaning as use embedded in a form of life also gives a version of the
Augustinian learning paradox that "no man ever does or can teach another anything."
No-one can achieve my understanding for me, not for the trivial reason that it is
mine, but because to internalize the requisite connections is to go beyond what is
presented  on  any  occasion  of  so-called  teaching.  Augustine  does  not  have
Wittgenstein's subtle arguments to bring out the multiplicity of ways in which I
might seem (to myself and others) to understand and later turn out to have missed
the  point,  which  in  turn  demonstrates  the  multiplicity  of  connections  in
understanding  itself.  But  we might  read Wittgenstein  as reviving  the  ancient
understanding of the complexity of understanding. [Burnyeat 1987, 23]
Understanding comes from the listener's integration into the form of life where a linguistic
expression is ordinarily used and where the "meaning is the use." This interpretation of
Wittgenstein's use of  indirect methods meshes well with our next topic-which takes us from
Kierkegaard's unsayable "how" to Ryle's inarticulate "knowing-how."
Ryle, Polanyi, and Oakeshott on Uncodified Knowledge
Knowledge that can be directly communicated has already been codified, but much knowledge
has the uncodified form of know-how, practical, or tacit knowledge. Gilbert Ryle (1900-1976),
Michael Polanyi (1891-1976), and Michael Oakeshott (1901-1990) have in different fields using
various terminologies explored the special problems of uncodified knowledge, including
alternatives to the naive pedagogy of direct teaching as if all knowledge were the technical,
explicit, codified, or knowing-that type of knowledge.
Polanyi [1962, 1966]  juxtaposes personal, implicit, or tacit knowledge to codified knowledge,
the latter being knowledge that can be said, written down, or transmitted over a wire.  But "we
know more than we can say" such as the knowledge implicit in using our native language,
recognizing faces, or perforning  skilled physical operations such as riding a bicycle.  Ryle
[1945-6, 1949] earlier makes the distinction between knowing-that and knowing-how, while
Oakeshott [1991] compares technical to practical knowledge. 25
For Oakeshott, "Rationalism is the assertion that what I have called practical knowledge is not
knowledge at all, the assertion that, properly speaking, there is no knowledge which is not
25  There is now something of a minor industry in making such distinctions.  See Schon 1983 for a related treatment
of professional versus instrumental knowledge, Marglin 1990 on techne versus episteme, and Scott 1998 on metis
versus episteme/techne.  The importance of the tacit/codified distinction is explored in Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995,
and they note that Squire 1987 gives a dozen labels for similar distinctions.
25technical knowledge." [1991, 15] Technical knowledge is codified and can be learned at least in
a rote sense from a book, a correspondence course, or a transmission over a wire.  But practical
knowledge requires a more indirect process.
On the other hand, practical knowledge can neither be taught nor learned, but only
imparted and acquired.  It exists only in practice, and the only way to acquire it is
by apprenticeship to a master-not because the master can teach it (he cannot), but
because it can be acquired only by continuous contact with one who is perpetually
practising it.... Thus a pianist acquires artistry as well as technique, a chess-player
style and insight into the game as well as knowledge of the moves, and a scientist
acquires (among other things) the sort of judgement which  tells him when his
technique is leading  him astray and the connoisseurship which enables him to
distinguish the profitable from the unprofitable directions to explore. [1991, 15]
As all knowledge has a practical as well as a technical component, the Rationalist tradition,
according to Oakeshott, tends to systematically ignore the practical component.  In what is even
a caricature of engineering, Rationalist politics and economics is assimilated to a kind of social
engineering based on technical knowledge.
Thus, political life is resolved into a succession of crises, each to be surmounted
by  the  application  of  'reason.'.  Each  generation, indeed,  each  administration,
should see unrolled before it the blank sheet of infinite possibility.  And if by
change  this  tabula  rasa has  been defaced  by  the irrational  scribblings of  the
tradition-ridden ancestors, then the first task of the Rationalist must be to scrub it
clean; as Voltaire remarked, the only way to have good laws is to burn all existing
laws and to start afresh. [1991, 9]
Indeed, Oakeshott remarks that it is characteristic of the Rationalist to think of getting rid of a
law by burning it-as if the law were only the codified part written down.
Social engineering with carrots and sticks based on Rationalist precepts will try to directly
implement change while ignoring the practical knowledge embedded in existing institutions and
thus it will most likely fail. 26 To utilize that practical knowledge, change must evolve out of the
existing configuration of customs and institutions.  A more indirect non-engineering approach
might foster that sort of change process.  However, a diehard social engineer might work to make
the practical and inarticulate knowledge explicit in order to have social engineering with a
human face.  Thus even if autonomy-compatibility is not taken as a constraint, there is a
practical-knowledge argument against enlightened social engineering based on skepticism about
the 'practicality' of turning the relevant practical knowledge into technique.
Michael Polanyi made the notion of tacit or personal knowledge into the centerpiece of his
philosophical viewpoint.  When one focuses on another face and recognizes it, the features of the
face necessary for recognition were only attended to in a "subsidiary awareness" [1962, 55] and
one would be hard put to articulate them. In one'sfocal  awareness of the face, these features are
26  See Scott  1998  for a less conservative  critique  of "high  Modernist"  social  engineering  also  based on an
appreciation  of the embedded  practical  knowledge  that  he calls metis.
26brought together in a gestalt-like way so that the face is seen as a familiar one.  One has a
commitment to that tacit knowledge and relies on it for the recognition. If one tries to articulate
the separate features of the face that make it recognizable, then one loses the gestalt.  Polanyi
generalized these aspects of tacit knowledge being utilized in a unifying way in all human
actions including rigorous scientific activity.
The bringing together or integrating of the underlying tacit knowledge is a creative mental
action, and thus it is reminiscent of the active (Kantian) role of the mind in Augustine's
Platonism and in modem generative linguistics.  Indeed Polanyi describes the child's acquisition
of language as the "early apprenticeship by which the child acquires the idiom of its native
community" [1962, 322]. Hence on Polanyi's analysis, the problem with direct methods of
teaching or transmitting knowledge is not simply that they neglect the tacit component but that
they do not supply the active integration of the tacit knowledge into the focal act of knowing.
Thus what is naively seen as direct transmission is really the more indirect prompting of internal
gestalt processes of learning and knowing.
Gilbert Ryle [1945-6, 1949] made an early distinction between knowing that (propositional
knowledge) and knowing how, the latter being his treatment of practical and personal
knowledge.  How does Ryle's treatment of the different types of knowing illuminate the direct
and indirect approaches to acquiring knowledge? Is the problem with the direct approach simply
that it tends to leave out tacit knowledge which might be picked up by indirect means? Or does
it relate back to the more passive role of the student under the direct method of teaching in
contrast to an indirect approach which casts the learner in a more active role?  For Ryle, the
important thing was not the explicit/implicit or codified/tacit distinction but the difference
between learning propositions (e.g., 7 x 8 = 56) essentially by rote and learning how to do
something (e.g., to multiply as well as to ride a bike). And when the student learns by doing,
then that inextricably active component in the student's role implies a more indirect approach,
whereas the direct approach is based on a "semi-surgical  picture of teaching as the forcible
insertion into the pupil's memory of strings of officially approved propositions" [1967, 108].
In a by-now familiar manner, Ryle poses the learning paradox.
[H]ow, in logic, can anyone be taught to do untaught things? ...How  can one
person teach another person to think things out for himself, since if he gives him,
say, the new arithmetical thoughts, then they are not the pupil's own thoughts; or
if they are his own thoughts, then he did not get them from his teacher?  Having
led the horse to the water, how can we make him drink? [1967, 105, 112]
Ryle's answer is along the lines of the motive inconsistency argument; there is no way to
heteronomously impose autonomous action.
How  can the teacher  be the  initiator of  the pupil's  initiatives? the  answer is
obvious.  He cannot. I cannot compel the horse to drink thirstily.  I cannot coerce
Tommy into doing spontaneous things.  Either he is not coerced, or they are not
spontaneous. ...  [1967, 112]
27How in logic can the teacher dragoon his pupil into thinking for himself, impose
initiative upon him, drive him into self-motion, conscript him into volunteering,
enforce originality upon him, or make him operate spontaneously?  The answer is
that he cannot-and  the reason why we half felt that me must do so was that we
were unwittingly  enslaved by the crude, semi-hydraulic idea that in  essence to
teach is to pump propositions, like 'Waterloo, 1815' into the pupils' ears, until they
regurgitate them automatically. [1967, 118]
Ryle makes the case for the indirect approach crystal clear.  The point is not the distinction
between codified propositions and tacit practical knowledge; even to actually use and apply
codified knowledge requires a knowing-how that needs to be acquired actively.  Thus the
problem with the direct approach to teaching is the inconsistency of trying to 'impose' active
learning.  The teacher can open the faucet, but cannot supply the pressure for the water to flow
(to use a neo-Platonic variation on the horse-to-water metaphor).  At best the teacher uses an
indirect approach to bring the learner to the threshold; the self-activity of the learner must carry
the process the rest of the way.
Gandhi and Satyagraha
In the case of Gandhi's method of social action called Satyagraha (truth-force), the relationship
between the first party A (helper) and the second party B (doer) is openly antagonistic.  The first
party is an aggrieved person or group who feels that their rights have been violated by the second
party who would typically be an established political or economic authority.  With these caveats
in mind, the helper-doer terminology will still be used-particularly in view of Erik Erikson's
analogy between the method of Satyagraha and the therapeutic relationship [1969, 413, 439].
In the relationship of mind to mind, the main problem of direct methods of influence is motive
inconsistency.  Means are employed to bring about a change of mind in the doer when the
motives are inconsistent with the desired change.  Often the motive inconsistency will be of little
concern if it is a one-time affair.  If one is being attacked, then one would like the attacker (doer)
to desist and one may not be fastidious about how the attacker's mind is changed.  Ideally one
might want a potential attacker to refrain out of recognition and respect for one's rights, and one's
defense might do little to bring about that recognition and motivation.  This motivational
inconsistency in one's defense would be of little practical consequence if the attack was a one-
time matter.  But if the situation is repeated as it would be in the case of group of people with a
long-standing grievance against an economic or political power, then one might want to consider
the motivational dynamics of one's method. Is there an alternative to the vicious cycle of  tit for
tat or eye for an eye (even the razor's edge of "exact" retaliation seems to lead inevitably to the
downward spiral of unequal retaliation)?
The first criterion for an alternative strategy is that it be motivationally consistent with the
desired actions on the part of the other party. That is the minimal basis for the passive "turning
the other cheek," for not feeding the vicious cycle of attack and counterattack dynamics.  The
next step is to design an active response strategy that will not only be consistent with a desired
motivation but will try to elicit a motive on the part of the doer that would lead to a mutually
acceptable state of affairs.  That goes beyond "turning the other cheek" to "Love your enemies
and pray for those who persecute you" [Matthew 5:45].
28Prior to reading Gandhi I had about concluded that the ethics of Jesus were only
effective in individual relationships.. The 'turn the other cheek' philosophy and the
'love your enemies' philosophy were only valid, I felt, when individuals were in
conflict with individuals; when racial groups and nations were in conflict a more
realistic approach seemed necessary.  But after reading Gandhi, I saw how utterly
mistaken I was.  Gandhi was probably the first person in history to lift the love
ethic  of  Jesus  above mere interaction between individuals to  a powerful  and
effective  social  force  on  a  large  scale.  [Martin Luther  King, Stride  Toward
Freedom quoted on dust jacket of: Gandhi 1961]
These strategies at the individual or social level go beyond the reach of direct carrot and stick
methods.  As Dewey remarked, "while we can shut a man up in a penitentiary we cannot make
him penitent." [1916, 26]  The "stick" at best deters and does not reform, and that may be the
best that can be expected against a Tamerlane or a Hitler. But in most social situations there are
other possibilities that might be obtained by more indirect methods.
By using indirect methods, mind can affect mind in ways that would be motivationally
impossible with direct carrot and stick methods. Indirect strategies are designed not just to get
the doer to change his behavior (e.g., for prudential reasons) but to change his "heart and mind"
and perhaps to set off a more positive dynamics to the benefit of both parties.  Changes at that
deeper motivational level cannot be forced, and any attempt to crudely force such changes will
only lead to resentment, resistance, and intransigence from the doer.  Thus indirect methods
operate on the basis of respect for the integrity of the doer.
After exhausting conventional channels to resolve the conflict, the aggrieved party may decide to
resort to Satyagraha.  This party (the helper trying to help the doer change) believes it has been
wronged on certain grounds by the doer; that is its "truth."  The "truths" asserted by the helper
must be heart-felt and not just tactics. To show that the claims are made for authentic reasons,
the helper must be vulnerable to rational counterarguments or new facts that might come to light,
and must under such circumstances change his mind.
A devotee of Truth may not do anything in deference to convention.  He must
always hold himself open to correction, and whenever he discovers himself to be
wrong he must confess it at all costs and atone for it. [Gandhi 1957, 350]
In this manner, arguments on the helper's side about these beliefs are kept on authentic grounds,
not on the level of strategy and tactics, and the doer can then be authentically invited to re-
examine his beliefs in the light of reason and evidence, not just self-interest.
The conflict is social and is carried out in public. In line with the old strategy to "fight a war to
achieve a peace" the actions of aggrieved party must be compatible with the doer changing his
mind while maintaining self-respect and self-esteem. While pressure will be brought on the doer
to provide motivational backups, the pressure should not take the form of injuries that would
derail the motivation for authentic change. That is the basis for the Gandhian doctrine of non-
injury or ashima.
29Under  the  Babul  Tree  Gandhi  announced  the  principle  which  somehow
corresponds to our amended [Golden] Rule: "That line of action is alone justice
which does not harm either party  to a dispute."  By harm he meant-and his daily
announcements leave no doubt of this-an  inseparable combination of economic
disadvantage, social indignity, loss of self-esteem, and latent vengeance. [Erikson
1964, 239]
In Joan Bondurant's authoritative treatment of Satyagraha, she noted: "If there is dogma in the
Gandhian philosophy, it centers here: that the only test of truth is action based on the refusal to
do harm." [1958, 25]  Thus Truth and ashima were two fundamental prongs in Satyagraha.
Ashima and Truth are so intertwined that it is practically impossible to disentangle
and separate them.  They are like the two sides of a coin, or rather of a smooth
unstamped metallic disk. ...Nevertheless ashima is the means; Truth is the end.
[Gandhi 1961, 42]
A third component is the self-suffering or tapasya which works to elevate the motivation of the
helper in the eyes of public opinion, if not in the eyes of the doer.
Self-suffering, the third element of  satyagraha, guarantees the  sincerity  of the
satyagrahi's own opinions, the while it restrains him from propagating uncertain
truths.  The  objective  of  satyagraha  is  to  win  the  victory  over  the  conflict
situation-to  discover further truths and to persuade the opponent, not to triumph
over him. [Bondurant 1958, 33]
This last point-about  winning the victory over the situation, not over the person-is  particularly
important as a means of maintaining respect for and the self-respect of the doer.  When actions
face constraints, it is very important whether or not the constraints are human-caused or
"natural."
'The nature of things does not madden us, only ill will does', said Rousseau.  The
criterion of oppression  is the part that I  believe to  be played  by other human
beings,  directly  or  indirectly,  with  or  without  the  intention  of  doing  so,  in
frustrating my wishes. [Berlin 1969, 123]
Thus the doer will change his mind more easily if the conflict can be reframed as a
depersonalized "situation" so that he is reacting to the situation rather than to specific pressure
from the aggrieved party.  In management theory, this is Mary Parker Follett's indirect method,
the "law of the situation."
Our job  is not how to get people to obey orders, but how to devise methods by
which we can best discover the order integral to a particular situation.  When that
is  found, the  employee can  issue it to  the  employer,  as  well as  employer  to
employee. [Follett 1992 (1926), 70]
30Thus unilateral command and pressure from another person is replaced by mutual recognition of
the "law of the situation."
Direct carrot and stick methods on the part of the aggrieved party, the helper, are motivationally
inconsistent with the motives that would bring about changes in the heart and mind of the doer.
To keep the space open in the doer for those transformative motives to develop and come into
the motivational foreground, the aggrieved party's actions should also be motivationally
compatible.  That means that those actions should be clearly based on shared principles, not
tactical self-interest (a point dramatized by the self-suffering or tapasya of the aggrieved party),
and that the arguments should appeal to shared reason and evidence.  Then it is possible for the
doer to yield to principles and reason with self-respect intact, not to be "defeated" by the other
party.
However, in view of the human powers of self-righteous rationalization, particularly on the part
of those who hold power, these appeals by themselves are not sufficient to bring about
transformative changes in the doer.  The point must be emphasized that just because external
pressure should not be in the motivational foreground to force the change in the doer, that does
not mean that external pressure should be absent. It is again a question of foreground and
background.  The basic idea of ashima is that the external pressures (e.g., economic boycotts)
should be kept going in the background, but should be designed so that they do not "take over"
or crowd out the appeals to the better motives of the doer.  Otherwise, the pressure might come
into the foreground and ignite the downward spiral of retaliatory dynamics.
Moreover, if the circumstances of the doer should change so that they would have to yield to the
extrinsic pressure alone, then, just as Gandhi put the drive for Indian independence on hold while
England was involved in WWII, the aggrieved party might reduce or temporarily suspend the
pressure, to help insure that the eventual changes on the part of the doer were made for the right
reasons.
In summary, Gandhi's Satyagraha-abstracted  from the particulars of the Indian case-is the
development of the indirect method into a full-fledged methodology of change in the context of
social oppression, and, as such, it is a social innovation of the first order.
Conclusion
My purpose has been to try to discern the theoretical basis for the indirect approach by looking
for the common themes in the use of the indirect approach in a wide variety of human endeavors
over a long period of intellectual history.  A common theme has emerged, once one allows for
the many different vocabularies and diverse settings. Actions have motives just as beliefs have
grounds.  In the wide spectrum of human endeavor, there is only a fairly small "bandwidth"
where the motives can be supplied by the carrots and sticks of the direct approach (including
agency theory and market-driven activities as special cases of the direct approach to affect
behavior).  Outside of that spectrum of pecuniary and prudential behavior, the attempt to use
direct methods in a controlling manner contradicts the motives for actions (and the grounds for
beliefs).  It is trying to "buy" love-trying to "impose" autonomy.  The externally supplied carrots
and sticks have a role only in the motivational background.
31For those "higher" human activities, the motives must come from within, as rational beliefs need
to be based on the exercise of our own critical judgment.  People then have an active role to
make the actions their own-or to make the beliefs their own. It is a variation on the old principle
that people have a natural ownership over the fruits of their own activity.  The helpers cannot
externally supply the doers' own-motives or own-reasons. The helpers can at best use the
indirect approach to bring the doers to the threshold; the doers have to do the rest-and that makes
the results their own.
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